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Pradeep Kanthan 13 September 2020

The India-China relationship brings back memories of the 1962 India-China War in the Himalayas. My father had taken part in the war and returned from it in 1963. He never spoke about it. Our Chinese schoolmates underwent milder internment than those in the other parts of the country. Something that should have shamed us, but never did.

In 1968, there was one instructor at the National Defence Academy who was a released prisoner of that war. He was known to have been brainwashed by the Chinese even as he went about his business as anyone else. He too never spoke about the war. Brigadier Dalvi’s book ‘The Himalayan Blunder’ was published the same year. Nobody was ready to tell us what really happened or what we are going to do about it. There was a lot of self-flagellation, blame games and it hurt the ego of some, but in reality, was soon forgotten. It remained a scar on the Indian landscape and, ‘six and two 62’, was always ‘Chinese Aggression’ in every game of Tambola. The Army had moved on!

The subject is far beyond that war and the incident at Galwan on the India-China border (if there is one), is the result of a series of historical and cultural happenings including that of the last few decades, perhaps a little less to do with geostrategy. Here are some reasons why there is a clash of cultures:

1. Sleeping and Rising China: The West’s relationship with China

The world witnessed the rise of China in the last few decades. It gives some meaning to the quote often mistakenly attributed to Napolean:

“Let China sleep. For when she wakes, the world will tremble!”

The genesis of the quote lies in the 1700s and the idea was quite commonplace in the 1800s. Trading with China was profitable and therefore fighting with them would only make them realise their strengths. So the idea of a China sleeping was better than an awoken one. Two other quotes are of relevance:

“Now great commercial advantage may be lost to England, and perhaps a war with China be the consequence. If I were an Englishman, I should esteem the man who advised a war with China to be the greatest enemy to my country in existence. You would in the end be beaten, and perhaps a revolution in India would follow.”

“You ought to monopolize the whole China trade to yourselves. Instead of going to war with the Chinese, it were better to make war with nations who desire to trade with them.”

https://www.napoleon.org/en/history-of-the-two-empires/articles/ava-gardner-china-and-napoleon/

These quotes reflect the thinking of the times. They are a good reason why the British did not venture into Tibet but kept a treaty that defined borders in some but not all the places. These sayings also reflect the West’s relationship with China. In reality, India sits in the same bucket as China as per this reflection, but unfortunately, a colonial history draws it to the other side.

2. China’s perpetual quest for a seat at the Western table

The Ming Dynasty had decided not to be ruled by foreigners to become like India. They kept foreign powers at bay.

Chinese labour had started going to the new world in search of gold and had even built the Californian railway. Indians too went as indentured labour but bonded to their colonial masters.

These occurrences in history are important to the build-up of centuries of Chinese diplomacy in the Western world. The West wouldn’t give them the proverbial seat at the table. This became relevant to the Chinese psyche.

There is also an Indian psyche which has been shaped by its colonial insecurities. Almost all parties, some with more zeal than the others like the Bharathiya Janata Party, a Hindu National Party seeks a remedy to the past. With some ambiguity, unless coaxed by a sense of patriotism driven by a dire situation, most Indians would be indifferent to border issues. This has been seen in all the wars when the country has rallied in its efforts. Patriotism is a great unifier.

Strictly speaking, both, India and China, could find a common ground in an area of ‘injustices of the past’. Perhaps not the ‘seat at the table’.

3. Knowledge interaction

Between 1999 and 2008 I had the opportunity to interact with Chinese academics and visiting PLA officials at the New Zealand Asia Institute and came to some conclusions, based on the seminars on China, which was a popular subject post the Tiananmen Square incident:

• The One China policy which is the core of the Cross-straits relationship with the Republic of China would come to an end only when their military surpasses that of the United States.
• They are committed to build the strongest military in the world.

There was never a mention of India. Quite a few of my Chinese colleagues who were brought up in the ’50s and ’60s vaguely remember a war with India. Most remembered Raj Kapoor’s ‘Mein Awara Hoon’!! This memory blank could well be because of growing up in an authoritarian state and a war in Tibet, which really was a far-flung outpost. I also gathered an impression that Tibetians being of different ethnicity and culture were treated as a minority, mostly ignored at Peking University. The other reason could be of not attaching any importance to India. This has eroded or kept on the sidelines the status of India as important but not relevant.

In India, this war got imprinted and reproduced over generations till Mr George Fernandez, a minister in the Bharathiya Janata Party-led government, publicly declared China as Enemy No 1. The Bharathiya Janata Party had then fired its first salvo a few decades ago.

Indian understanding of China has largely been through the writings of the West who have been interacting with China for centuries. 1962 India China War was a surrogate one fought by India at the behest of the United States. Did Nehru take the initiative or did Chou en lai backstab Nehru? The Chinese definitely seemed to be well prepared. United States support was expected but came too late. The support was visible in US-made ordnance equipment like camp stoves, torches, coat parkas and perhaps the 75 mm pack howitzer. (Though I suspect this may be a leftover of the Burma Campaign). With the presence of Peace Corps workers and Kennedy’s charisma in India after his visit in March 1962, there is no doubt that India fought a surrogate war. More like the war was outsourced to India.

4. Post Cold War

The cold war ended, the Berlin wall fell, but India-China relations did not change.

Chinese thinking entered Western academia. It is important to separate the Western ideas about China introduced by people such as Pearl S Buck of the United States and Riwi Alley of New Zealand. They represent legendary relationships with China. India too had Amar Kotnis, but was not there to celebrate a relationship with independent India.

Chinese academia has been interacting with the West since the late ’80s. Interaction with India is more recent but also is mostly through Western ideas.

I worked closely with two academics. One was the first person from the People’s Republic of China to have gained a PhD from Oxford, and the other was from China’s Academy of Social Sciences. I did gather two basic aspects from their impressions about India which though trivial to me, had caught their imagination:

• India has states, whereas China doesn’t.
• India is more chaotic than China and has a caste system. There is general curiosity about the caste system.

The Naxal movement in India has its roots in Maoism. I was keen to know if there was a Chinese connection to it, which should be an obvious one, but they said it’s just a borrowed name. There is a feeling in India that the Communist Party of India has links with China as much as the ISKON movement has with the CIA.

It was apparent to me that some study of India does take place, as Hindi is taught at their language school in Beijing. Their interest in India grew from being a desk to a department in 3 to 4 decades.

The Western version of China pervades Indian political thinking. The Chinese attribute of gnawing away its neighbours is an American assessment and figures in their annual report on China. In recent times we have heard General Bipin Rawat of the Indian Army echo these ideas as ‘salami-slicing’ and a ‘two-front’ war. The Chinese from their perspective is trying to get back what they believe is theirs. For this reason, they have border disputes and have waged wars in the past. What would they gain by inching other than putting pressure on their neighbours especially when their economic and military power rivals the US? While they fit into a Westphalian system, they seek an Asian model, a Chinese model of growth with their neighbours. The BRI and CPEC fit into these constructs. Their attempts to seek India’s cooperation seemed to have failed.

The current Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the PRC of 2020 (referenced below) mentions the historic border dispute with Vietnam, Russia and India. The 1979 Vietnam-China war was a proxy Soviet-China War. It proved to the Chinese they can take on a superpower. Today they have an open border and trade with Vietnam. The report tells us that China has made concessions with several neighbours to settle border disputes. It also tells us that China has reached a level of military superiority.

The report in reality could possibly be a Chinese assessment fed through academia that surfaces as a US Department of Defense report. China feeds knowledge about itself to the US through academia. This has led to a good understanding of China and helped in areas such as trade and education. Many Chinese government officials at even lower levels have had exposure to western education. Sister city projects did see interaction at a people to people level.

However not much is revealed of their psyche. In the words of Pearl S Buck who lived and worked there for 40 years:

‘Chinese make excellent friends but terrible enemies.’

Interview of Pearl Buck on Canadian TV.

They harbour their strategies for decades.

5. Ladhak and the borders with China

There were reports by shepherds sighting Chinese soldiers on their grazing grounds in Ladhak.

In 1972, I was on a patrol in the Northern part of Sikkim, which was an independent country then. The maps were not accurate and a china-graph pencil (these coloured pencils are used to write on the talc sheet covers of maps, the name is just coincidental), can cover 100 square feet on the ground! The tree line in Sikkim is around 3,800 meters or 12,400 feet above MSL. (No trees grow above that height but oxygen levels are good at that height, quite unlike Ladhak that has a much lower treeline). Tibetan plateau is around this tree line in that area, so when we saw plain ground, we kind of knew where we were. Our patrol had wandered into Chinese territory! We saw their patrol too, probably lost like us. Somebody from the patrol waved, they waved and we moved on. Quite routine!

The Galwan incident was different. A serious encounter and subsequent standoff have been explained in great tactical detail by former Army Commanders and subject matter experts. The incident appears to have been on the doubtful side of the Line of Actual Control. Point of truth is the casualty figures which are a result of a fight. With or without arms it is a conflict. Never before has the Indian public been made aware in such detail of happenings on the India China border. Also never before has the Indian Army suffered casualties in such a manner. The ‘conflict’ is fluid changing by the day. This is receiving greater coverage in India than action against militants in Kashmir. Perhaps for a reason. The success or failure at Ladhak has a domestic benefit for the Modi government more than for Xi Jinping, for the same reason as in 1962 that most of China weren’t concerned about the war in Tibet. In any case there are no democratic elections in China.

5. Current compulsions and reactions

The fact that talks have taken place indicates a willingness to see peace. However, both sides show escalation. Quite akin to Soviet-China conflict that lasted several months. The outcome of that war was a newfound respect for China by the United States. Ladhak could well mean that China is almost ready at that military superiority level, but is being forced into a premature commitment by India. This could dictate the responses and delays leading to conflict or agreement. China can make accommodation on border issues.

Deducing from the circumstances of the Nehruvian period, adequate evidence exists today to indicate a United States compulsion behind the Galwan incident. China carefully capped off its dominating moves in the South China Sea. A region of great importance to the US security of the Pacific region (which incorporates India as a named partner by renaming it as Indo-Pacific region). Some more events highlight the circumstances:

• The Republic of China changes its name to Taiwan on its passports. This is significant in the Cross-Straits relationship.
• The Hong Kong pro-democracy movement gets nominated for a Nobel Peace Prize.
• India publicises a long-held secret of Tibetian troops.

All these events seem choreographed to rub the CCP where it hurts. The Galwan incident, the build-up of PLA in the region has to be read in conjunction with events that stand up to China. Clearly every border incident with China has a US highlight.

The world view on China is a US one, as there is no other to compare. Most countries are not concerned with the geostrategic complexity which faces India. Thus Pakistan, Nepal and Bangladesh are either not invested in the situation or just see China’s intentions differently.

By natural reasons China and India must see themselves as neighbours and part of a geographical region of Asia, culturally and politically they are different from European or Latin American or African. South Asia, which is predominantly an Indian type of culture is a distinct part of the greater Asian culture.

Further, Chinese culture is core to North Asia (Korea, Japan and Taiwan) with a common, if a not distinct overlay of Buddhism. The Buddhist aspect makes the East of India have a benign attitude towards India, unbeknownst to Indians.

Most of Asia was colonised by Western powers. China was not typically colonised but retained a political and military entity through centuries to date. India, on the other hand, emerged from a collection of colonised states.

China wants to forge an Asian world and it has gone through a process of national identity, cultural revolution and modernisation to benchmark itself against the West. Their communism transformed into controlled capitalism. They built their military in just a few decades to rival the US. India too went through a similar process, with democracy and modified socialism but at a slower pace.

China claims the territories of Arunachal, Sikkim, Bhutan and Ladhak as being historically a part of Tibet. Tibet itself was autonomous during the Ming period. Bhutan is an independent country, Sikkim joined India in 1973. Arunachal and Ladhak were the inheritance of colonial times. Hindu Nationalism has an Akhanda Bharat, which clashes with China’s historical territorial claim. Tibet’s Mansarovar Lake is of significance to Hindus.

Principally China doesn’t want to agree on borders because of India’s alignment with the US. It is, therefore, necessary to keep in mind the grand plan of the Chinese, which is to surpass the US and execute its One China Policy and create an Asian model of progress.

The Asian model or Chinese model can be seen in the Belt and Road Initiative. One can view it as a genuine development project or a debt trap or a grand military strategy.

6. Is India the Lone Ranger?

Chinese influence in the Americas goes back centuries. Australia and New Zealand have a Chinese presence going back to the Gold mining days of the 1800s. Chinese are in the political system. China is a major trading partner and Australian and New Zealand education export programme runs on Chinese students. Much of the economy of the Pacific region runs on Chinese trade.

Chinese have integrated into Western societies over a few centuries. Their presence boosts the economy in many parts of the world. They have culturally appropriated western customs while retaining Confucian ideas of a state. Their exclusion from colonialism gave them greater freedom to interact with the world.

India seeks support of the Allies of World War 2 and has generally been aligned to it, even as it has never committed troops on the ground. Trump did make a mention of a commitment to Afghanistan. India appears as a fair-weather ally and takes comfort in the treaties and joint exercises with blocks that are supposedly inimical to China. While India is big enough to defend itself, it lacks the strategic foresight to rival a growing China. Nehru erred, perhaps under a pressure from the dominating US. Indira Gandhi carefully avoided confrontation as she had abandoned hopes of support from the US. The UPA government’s policy was to keep peace with China, apparent from no border incursions or salami slicing! If there, they did not make it to breaking or national news and was handled by the diplomats.

Hindu Nationalist Governments under Vajpayee and Modi have made it a national cause to stand up to China, with the hope of US help. The recent Galwan incident with casualties are shrouded in doubtful circumstances as declared by Modi himself.

Despite the bonhomie relations between Modi and Xi, they have yet to talk with each other. India appears to be bereft of allies. In reality, no one has taken any action to ban Chinese goods or trade, with some exceptions. Further, will India expect foreign direct involvement in its fight against China?

7. Chinese vulnerabilities

Historically the Chinese were troubled by the tribes to the west. Yuezhi were the nomadic tribes that were a constant threat, but also a market for Chinese silk. They were also an impediment on the Silk Road. The ancient Yuezhi later mutated into the Kushans of Northern India. The historical irony will see war and trade as a promoter of peace in the 21 Century! The current situation is different from the circumstances of 1962. China had emerged from the experiences of a civil war, India from a post-world war experience mostly in other theatres.

India has the experience that China lacks. The Kargil War, seven decades of other wars and being in contact with an enemy would be an experience to count.

8.Nobody wants a war

Ayesha Siddiqi, a Pakistani Analyst has opined that Pakistan’s economic plight can ill afford a war. (My feeling is that Pakistan would not benefit from a war between India and China, rather be threatened by latter and may emerge as a conciliator or be neutral). While they may not join the war on China’s side, they do harbour a hope of China solving the Kashmir issue.

China itself is in the throes of its One China policy coming under threat. While a good reason lies in building infrastructure peripheral to Ladhak, there is an advantage in dominating their assets from neighbouring heights. This is more of a tactical argument for both sides but would not justify a war.

The recent 5 point agreement between Jaishankar and Wang is muddled in historical lines and awaits the nod from Xi. Unfortunately, many granular details have emerged and it is now an issue of inches being lost over kilometres. Peace must be given a chance.

Modi’s hour of leadership may have eventually arrived!

REPORT TO US CONGRESS : CHINA MILITARY POWER REPORT